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I. INTRODUCTION 
It has become standard form, indeed borderline cliché, to open discussions 
regarding the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)1 with the words of 
President George H.W. Bush as he signed the legislation into law.2  To hedge 
against the risk of being too iconoclastic—contrary to what ensues—this 
commentary will follow suit: 
[The ADA] signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of 
persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life.  As the 
Declaration of Independence has been a beacon for people all over the world 
seeking freedom, it is my hope that the Americans with Disabilities Act will 
likewise come to be a model for the choices and opportunities of future 
generations around the world.3 
However, as the number of individuals with HIV around the globe 
continues to grow,4 one inescapable truth continues to dim the brightness of the 
ADA’s domestic and international impact: namely, the ADA, as enforced by 
American courts, has never adequately protected HIV positive individuals from 
unjustified discrimination and exclusion from mainstream American life. 
American courts have formed barriers to protection for HIV positive 
individuals, contrary to the plain meaning and legislative intent of the statute.  
The main barrier has been a shrinking definition of who is disabled.  
Specifically, despite initially being hailed by some as advancing the rights of 
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 1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2007). 
 2. See Teresa A. Schneider, Note, Stretching the Limits of the ADA: Asymptomatic HIV-Positive 
Status as a Disability in Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 77 NEB. L. REV. 206, 206 (1998); Ann 
Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 997, 997 (2004); Christopher E. 
Tierney, Comment, Casey Martin, Ford Olinger and the Struggle to Define the Limits of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act in Professional Golf, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 335, 335 (2001); Karen M. Volkman, Comment, 
The Limits of Coverage: Do Insurance Policies Obtained through an Employer and Administered by Insurance 
Companies Fall Within the Scope of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 249, 
249 (1999). 
 3. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602. 
 4. UNAIDS, Report on the global AIDS Epidemic: Executive Summary, A UNAIDS 10th 
anniversary special edition at 6 (2006), available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/ 
2006/2006_GR-ExecutiveSummary_ en.pdf. 
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people with HIV/AIDS under the ADA, the Bragdon v. Abbott5 decision by the 
Supreme Court did not go far enough.  In favor of people with HIV/AIDS, the 
Court did rule that HIV, even when asymptomatic, constitutes an impairment 
under the ADA.6  The Court also held that reproduction was a major life activity 
that HIV substantially limited.7  However, perhaps because it was endeavoring 
to walk too fine a line between providing protection and appeasing the strict 
textualists, the Kennedy majority opinion did not determine that HIV/AIDS 
was a per se disability under the ADA.  As a consequence, Bragdon left open a 
fair amount of latitude for courts to determine whether a major life activity was 
being limited and, thus, a fair amount of latitude on whether a person was 
disabled.  Not missing a beat, courts have taken advantage of that latitude to 
continually shrink the definition of “disabled” and the scope of the ADA’s 
application.8  This note argues that the only way to adequately ensure that all 
people with HIV/AIDS are adequately protected from discrimination is for the 
courts to rule, or Congress to clarify, that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act—as it was intended to be. 
Part II of this note will provide a primer on the ADA and its requirements 
with respect to the definition of “disabled.”  Part III will discuss the Bragdon 
decision, its advances, and its shortcomings.  Part IV, the crux of the argument, 
will address how a per se disability interpretation of the ADA is more consistent 
with the plain language, legislative history, administrative regulations, and 
prior legal history of the ADA.  Part V argues that a per se disability 
interpretation makes the most sense from a policy perspective, a practical 
perspective, and provides built-in checks to prevent a per se disability 
interpretation from allowing a flood of frivolous litigation. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
As indicated by President Bush’s prophetic language, the ADA was 
intended to usher in dramatic societal change aimed at enabling the 
achievement of economic autonomy and social equality for the disabled.9  
Congress’ own sentiments regarding the purpose and the importance of the Act 
are no less charged.  Invoking the “sweep of its congressional authority,”10 
Congress states that the purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”11  Specifically, the ADA prohibits discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities by employers (Title I), public entities (Title 
II), and places of public accommodation (Title III). 
 
 5. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 6. Id. at 637. 
 7. Id. at 641. 
 8. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999) (holding that an 
impairment that can be treated by medication or technology does not constitute a disability); see also, 
infra at pp. 9–11. 
 9. Bush supra note 3. 
 10. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2007). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
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The definition of who is disabled is the same for all three provisions.  
According to the definitions section of the ADA, “[t]he term “disability” means, 
with respect to an individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) 
a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”12  Hence, to be considered disabled under the Act and thus able to 
access its protections, a person must satisfy three criteria with respect to 
subsection (A).  They must (1) have an impairment (2) that substantially limits 
(3) a major life activity. 
However, nowhere does Congress define what constitutes a major life 
activity—the third element.  That said, much can be gleaned regarding its 
intended scope from the ADA’s precursor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,13 and 
the ADA’s implementing regulations.  The Rehabilitation Act’s regulations give 
a non-exhaustive, yet broad, list of examples of major life activities which 
include “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, 
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”14  This is 
significant because Congress, knowing that its Rehabilitation Act had been 
implemented and interpreted as such by the agencies charged with its 
enforcement, used the same defining language in both the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA.15  This repetition is important because it demonstrates the 
sanctioning of the broad interpretation and implementation by the pre-ADA 
implementing agencies.16  Additionally, the ADA regulations enacted by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) adopt the same non-exhaustive list of major life activities.17  
Indeed, motivated by a desire to ensure that the Rehabilitation Act and its 
accompanying regulations and jurisprudence were not chipped away at by the 
courts, Congress specifically commanded the courts not to apply a lower 
standard than was applied under the Rehabilitation Act.18 
Further, as will be outlined more fully in part IV, it seems fairly evident 
both from the legislative history and the Rehabilitation Act case law that 
HIV/AIDS was intended to be considered as a disability across the board.19  
However, in Bragdon and even more so in the cases that have followed, 
American courts have turned a blind eye to the relatively clear instruction from 
 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 13. 29 U.S.C. § 790 (repealed 1992). 
 14. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2007): 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (2007). 
 15. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]: H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 
50 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE LABOR REPORT]: H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990) [hereinafter 
HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT]. 
 16. See Donald H.J. Hermann, The Developments of AIDS Federal Civil Rights Law: Anti-
Discrimination Law Protection of Persons Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 33 IND. L. REV. 
783, 854 (2000) (discussing the impact of incorporating the previous interpretation and the Court’s 
awareness of this in the Abbott decision). 
 17. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2007). 
 18. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2007). 
 19. For further discussion regarding the legislative history and pre-ADA cases interpreting the 
meaning of major life activity. See infra part IV. 
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Congress to apply the ADA in a no less exacting, protecting fashion than the 
Rehabilitation Act and to include HIV/AIDS as a disability. 
III. BRAGDON V. ABBOTT, ITS ADVANCES, AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
The Supreme Court’s only decision on what constitutes a major life activity 
within the context of HIV/AIDS was Bragdon v. Abbott, a Title III case in which 
the dentist of an HIV positive, but asymptomatic, plaintiff, Sidney Abbott, 
would only treat her in a hospital and if she bore the additional expenses.20  
Abbott brought suit under Section 12182(a) of the ADA alleging discrimination 
based on her HIV status. 
The main issue in contention was whether Abbott had a protected 
disability.  To determine this, the Court rightly looked to section 12102(2) which, 
again, defines “disability” as a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits a major life activity.21  With regard to the first element of impairment, the 
Court relied heavily on the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(“HEW”) regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act which, as the Court 
notes, “appear without change in the current regulations issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Services.”22  Those regulations define 
“physical or mental impairment” as “(A) any physiological disorder or 
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of 
the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; 
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, 
genitor-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.”23  The Court noted 
that in issuing these regulations the HEW, and later the DOJ, did not list any 
specific disorders to avoid the impression that if not specifically enumerated, a 
certain impairment was not included.24  Even so, the commentary accompanying 
the regulations does contain a vast representative list ranging from heart disease 
to alcoholism.25 
The Court, relying on these regulations as nearly dispositive of the 
meaning of “impairment,” found that, from the moment of infection, HIV “must 
be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant and detrimental effect 
on the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems.”26  Indeed, the Court 
concluded that “HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of 
a physical impairment during every stage of the disease.”27  The Court did not 
perform an individual inquiry regarding the physical impairment aspect of the 
“disability” definition.28  The Court did not determine whether it was an 
 
 20. 524 U.S. 624, 624 (1998). 
 21. Id. at 630. 
 22. Id. at 632. 
 23. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (2007). 
 24. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633. 
 25. 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (2007). 
 26. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637. 
 27. Id. (emphasis added). 
 28. See Hermann, supra note 16,  at 851 (describing the Court’s wholesale approach of treating 
HIV/AIDS as a physical impairment without specifically and individually examining whether it was 
an impairment to Abbott). 
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impairment to Abbott, but analyzed the disease in the abstract, concluding that 
if a person had the virus, regardless of the symptoms or CD4 count, there is 
impairment.29  This is important because the Court recognizes, at least implicitly, 
that an individualized inquiry need not be performed with respect to the 
physical impairment part of the disability definition.  Therefore, Bragdon 
supports the conclusion that an individualized inquiry is not necessary even 
though the “with respect to an individual” language of the definition applies 
equally to the physical impairment prong as it does to the “major life activity” 
prong.30 
Having determined that HIV infection constitutes a physical impairment 
under the ADA, the Court then turned its attention to the second element of 
“disability” under the ADA: whether or not a “major life activity” is being 
affected.  The Court noted that the plain meaning of the term “major” denoted 
comparative importance.31  Observing the breadth of the term “major life 
activity,” the Court held that nothing in the definition suggests that activities 
without a public, economic, or daily character were outside what constituted a 
“major life activity.”32  This holding opened the door for the Court’s 
determination that reproduction is a “major life activity.”33 
After holding that reproduction was a “major life activity,” the Court 
addressed the third element of the definition of disability: whether there is a 
substantial limitation.  Put in context, the Court answered whether having HIV 
was a substantial limitation on the “major life activity” of reproduction.  It did 
so by analyzing medical data which suggested that an HIV-positive woman 
trying to conceive imposes a significant risk of passing the infection to a man 
and to her child, despite antiretroviral treatment.34  The Court also noted that 
some state public health control measures forbid people with HIV from 
engaging in intercourse with others.35  Because of these laws and the significant 
risk of transmission to both sexual partner and fetus, the Court found that HIV 
was a substantial limitation on reproduction, a “major life activity.”36 
Consequently, Abbott was “disabled” under the ADA and thus entitled to 
protection.37  Unfortunately, not all HIV positive people will similarly benefit 
from protection because the Court sidestepped38 the opportunity to clarify that 
some impairments, particularly HIV, are per se disabilities under the ADA.  By 
so doing, the Court missed an opportunity to ensure that this misunderstood 
disease received the full protection against discrimination envisioned by 
Congress. 
 
 29. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637.   
 30. See id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2007). 
 31. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 639. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 641. 
 36. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 641–42 (“In view of our holding, we need not address the second question presented, 
i.e., whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA.”). 
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The consequences of not addressing the per se disability question are grave 
and have become apparent since the Bragdon opinion.  Strikingly, by basing 
accessibility to the protections of the ADA on, for example, reproduction (which 
in the eyes of many, including the dissent, was a stretch to begin with)39 the 
Court left exposed to discrimination those who have HIV, but are no longer able 
to reproduce or have no intention to reproduce.  This includes post-menopausal 
women, sterile men and women, and many homosexuals.  Moreover, because 
the Court endorses the individualized approach to determining whether a 
person’s major life activity is infringed (even though they do not perform an 
individualized inquiry with regard to impairment), it grants conservative courts 
the leeway to construe facts so that even though a person is impaired with HIV, 
a “major life activity” is not impaired. 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist and others criticized the majority for not 
doing enough of an “individualized inquiry.”40  To mollify these critics courts 
would need to scrutinize and probe whether the particular plaintiff, in this case 
Abbott, was capable of having children, wanted to have children, or was 
planning on having children with seemingly no limit to how far the court can 
delve.  Thankfully, the majority opted for a more benign and less intrusive 
implementation of the “individualized inquiry” into whether there is a 
substantial limitation on a “major life activity.”  Nevertheless the Court used a 
model, that without checks, can be just as malleable and soul-searching as the 
standard called for by the dissent.  To be specific, the Bragdon decision 
examined whether HIV is a substantial limitation to reproduction for a straight 
female and, to a certain extent, inquired into the personal, individual effect that 
HIV had on Abbott’s life.41  The effect being that HIV/AIDS deterred her from 
reproducing.42  However, by never spelling out how deep the individual inquiry 
is to go—and by condoning the practice with regard to people with 
HIV/AIDS—the Court gave another avenue for courts to limit the protected 
class through judicial interpretation. 
It did not take long for courts to take advantage of the vagaries and 
unanswered questions of Bragdon.  Indeed, in the very next term, the Court 
addressed the meaning of major life activity, albeit this time not in the context of 
HIV/AIDS.  In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. the Court, relying on the present 
indicative tense of the statute, held that an individual must be “presently—not 
potentially or hypothetically—substantially limited in order to demonstrate a 
disability.”43  The Court used this finding to buttress its ultimate decision: if a 
disability can be corrected through medication or technology, then it does not 
impair a “major life activity.”44  This is bad news for people with HIV who, 
 
 39. See Laing P. Akers, The Wrong Standard, the Right Decision: Opening Pandora’s Box in Bragdon 
v. Abbott, 28 CAP. U.L. REV. 421, 440–48 (2000) (arguing that reproduction should not be regarded as a 
major life activity because it is not repeatedly performed or crucial to daily existence). 
 40. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657. 
 41. Id. at 641. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). 
 44. Id. at 482.  See also Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Symposium: The Americans with Disabilities Act: A 
Ten-Year Retrospective: The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark 
Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 326 (2000) (discussing the Sutton decision but highlighting how the House 
01__THOMPSON.DOC 5/27/2008  2:01:34 PM 
 ABBOTT, AIDS, AND THE ADA 7 
though per se impaired under Bragdon, can be treated with antiretrovirals and, 
thus, are deemed to not have major life activities affected.  As science and drugs 
improve (as they already have since the time of Bragdon) it is not hard to 
envision courts finding, on a factual basis, that reproduction is not impaired by 
HIV.  Thus, on its face, the Sutton decision hinges the protection granted to HIV 
positive individuals on some future court’s opinion of whether prevailing 
medicine “corrects” an HIV positive individual’s ability to reproduce.  Put 
differently, an HIV positive individual can expect her rights to be ever-changing 
and fleeting. 
Moreover, the Court took the opportunity in Sutton to resolve what 
ambiguity had existed post-Bragdon and specifically held that an individualized 
inquiry must be conducted45—subjecting each individual to an vast amount of 
scrutiny and subjecting the courts to an incredible amount of work and 
resources in adjudicating discrimination claims under the ADA. 
Sutton also conflicts with both the legislative history and EEOC 
regulations.46  Both the House Judiciary Report and the House Labor Report on 
the ADA indicate that whether or not a person is disabled should be decided by 
evaluating him or her absent mitigating measures.47  As one commentator 
phrased it, “a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in the major 
life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected through the use of 
a hearing aid.”48  While it seems obvious that the hearing-impaired are deaf 
regardless of whether an aid helps and should be afforded protection and 
accommodations for their infirmity, the same logic is no less applicable within 
the context of HIV/AIDS. 
The judicial shrinking of the definition of “disability” continued in Murphy 
v. United Parcel Service, Inc.49 (decided contemporaneously with Sutton) where 
the Tenth Circuit and then the Supreme Court again took a chunk out of what 
constituted a “major life activity” and, consequently, the size of the protected 
class.50  The Court held that the plaintiff, who was dismissed from his job due to 
his hypertension, was not, in fact, disabled because while taking medication he 
was not limited in the tasks he could perform.51  A safeguard to horrible ironies 
such as this are the “regarded as” provisions within the definition of who is 
disabled.  However, here, as in Sutton, the Court held that the employer had 
merely regarded him as unable to perform a particular job and that for work to 
 
Judiciary Report on the ADA stated that when determining whether a disability existed, mitigating 
measures should not be considered). 
 45. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. 
 46. Tucker, supra note 44, at 328–29. (discussing the conflict between the Sutton decision, on one 
hand, and the legislative history and regulations, on the other, which both said not to consider 
mitigating measures). 
 47. HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT at pt. 3, at 28–29; HOUSE LABOR REPORT at pt. 2, at 52. 
 48. TUCKER, supra note 44, at 325. 
 49. 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 50. For more information and further detailed explanations of both the Sutton and Murphy 
decisions see Tucker, supra note 44, at 327–33. 
 51. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521. 
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be a “major life activity,” the plaintiff had to be unable or regarded as unable to 
perform a broad range of jobs.52 
Some have argued that despite the shrinking definition of “major life 
activity,” the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability provides 
another avenue of protection.53  However, courts have been very restrictive here 
as well.  For example, in Roberts v. Unidynamics Corp, the Eighth Circuit 
determined that remarks by co-workers that the plaintiff might have AIDS were 
insufficient to demonstrate that the company regarded him as having AIDS.54  
Moreover, the court held that even if the plaintiff demonstrated that the 
employer regarded him as having AIDS, his burden was to demonstrate that the 
employer regarded him as having a substantial impairment of a “major life 
activity” and discriminated against him for this reason.55  However, in most 
cases the discrimination has little or nothing to do with some “major life 
activity” such as reproduction or the inability of a person with AIDS to perform 
some employment task but rather arises out of fear or misunderstanding 
surrounding the disease.  Hence, proving that the employer regards the plaintiff 
as substantially impaired in a “major life activity” is difficult, if not impossible, 
thus severely undercutting the scope of who is covered and the statute’s 
purpose. 
Though the Court in Bragdon ruled that HIV/AIDS is a per se impairment, 
indicated a willingness to interpret “major life activity” in a more expansive 
way, and did some heavy lifting in interpreting reproduction as a “major life 
activity,” by not ruling that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability the Court left open 
an avenue to narrow what constitutes a disability under the ADA.  
Unfortunately, too many courts, including the Supreme Court, have gone down 
that avenue and have hampered an individual’s freedom from discrimination. 
Now that Bragdon and its progeny’s shortcomings have been elucidated, it 
is necessary to outline the legal soundness and benefits of a per se disability 
ruling for HIV/AIDS. 
IV. THE LEGAL SOUNDNESS OF A PER SE DISABILITY RULING 
A. Plain Language 
One of the main tools used to limit the ADA’s application is to rely, almost 
exclusively, on the plain meaning of the text, ignoring legislative history, 
precedent, administrative regulations, and other tools of construction.  The 
words of the statute are of primary importance but they do not exist in isolation.  
As Tony Maida describes it, “[i]n the age of ‘new textualism’  . . .  the question of 
the plaintiff’s inclusion in the ADA’s conditional protected class has increasingly 
become a convenient vehicle for courts to dispose of ADA cases.”56  While the 
 
 52. Id. at 524.  See also Tucker, supra note 44, at 322. 
 53. Akers, supra note 39, at 446. 
 54. 126 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir.) (1997). 
 55. Id. at 1092. 
 56. Tony Maida, Note and Comments, How Judicial Myopia is Jeopardizing the Protection of People 
with HIV/AIDS under the ADA, 27 AM. J.L. AND MED. 301, 305–06 (2001). 
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following sections focus on how the text, in conjunction with the legislative 
history, regulations, and previous case law, demonstrate that HIV/AIDS was 
intended to be a per se disability, this section argues that the plain text in-and-
of-itself also indicates that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability. 
The main textual argument supporting the idea that HIV/AIDS is not a per 
se disability is that the definition of “disability” includes “with respect to an 
individual.”57  While those words could certainly be read to mean that each 
individual needs to be examined, it is far from self-evident.  Moreover, other 
sections of the ADA text explicitly mention a “class of individuals with 
disabilities.”58  If “with respect to an individual” is to be fairly interpreted as 
requiring an individualized inquiry into one’s disability status, then no less fair 
is the conclusion that by referring to classes of individuals with disabilities the 
text contemplates that there exist impairments which are, by definition, always 
disabilities.  Thus, people with these disabilities “can be identified and treated as 
a class.”59 
Certain impairments can and should be treated as a class when the effects 
are predictable and universally limiting.60  Such disabilities include blindness, 
quadriplegia, and HIV infection.  No one would question whether a person 
paralyzed from the neck down is substantially limited in a major life activity—a 
step by step, individualized inquiry is superfluous and it is borderline insulting 
to scrutinize and question a person whose life has been so devastated.  The same 
is true when questioning the impact that HIV/AIDS has on a person’s life.  As 
the Court in Bragdon noted, the disease begins to damage immediately and 
severely: 
[I]nfection with HIV causes immediate abnormalities in a person’s blood, and 
the infected person’s white cell count continues to drop throughout the course 
of the disease  . . .  HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder 
with a constant and detrimental effect on the infected person’s hemic and 
lymphatic systems from the moment of infection.61 
It is this constant attack that leads almost inevitably to the HIV victim’s 
death.  Moreover, the Court in Bragdon found that the text of the statute did not 
mandate an individualized inquiry with respect to the physical impairment 
prong of disability, not withstanding the “with respect to an individual” 
language.62  Hence, Bragdon, despite its shortcomings, could be seen as important 
in interpreting the plain meaning of “with respect to an individual” expansively. 
In line with the textual interpretation of HIV as a per se disability is the 
purpose of the Act, which is part of the text and should not be ignored even 
from a textualist approach.  However, even if the purpose was not specifically 
enumerated by Congress, courts should look to Congress’ purpose to resolve 
 
 57. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2007). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). 
 59. Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 29, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (No. 97—156) 
[Hereinafter Brief]. 
 60. Id. at 28. 
 61. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998). 
 62. See id. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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any questions regarding the plain meaning of the statute in alignment with that 
purpose.63  If it is not clear from the text that certain classes of impairments are 
per se disabilities, then an ambiguity exists in the text and the purpose must be 
evaluated.  Again, because Congress codified its purpose, that purpose should 
be evaluated regardless of ambiguity in the text. 
Congress’ stated purpose is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities”64 and a “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”65  It is hard to imagine 
grander, clearer language; the purpose of this Act was to eliminate 
discrimination against people who had been historically disadvantaged and 
discriminated against.  People with HIV/AIDS, especially in the decade 
preceding the enactment of the ADA, have suffered such discrimination—
perhaps more than any other group. 
In conjunction with the articulated purpose of the statute, the plain 
meaning should be evaluated in light of the statute’s remedial nature.  It is 
standard statutory interpretation that remedial legislation, such as the ADA, 
should be interpreted broadly to effectuate Congress’ intention of prohibiting 
discrimination.66  That broad interpretive gloss dictates that the conflicting 
references to individuals and classes of individuals be read to afford as much 
protection as possible.  The reading that affords the most protection includes 
HIV/AIDS as a per se disability. 
B. Legislative History 
Any remaining doubt regarding Congress’ statutory intent to include some 
classes of disabilities as per se disabilities is easily overcome by the voluminous 
legislative history.  Legislative history is valuable when the statutory language is 
not clear on its face.  However, even when “the language of the statute is clear, 
any lingering doubt as to its proper construction may be resolved by examining 
the legislative history.”67  The legislative history of the ADA evinces a clear 
intent and understanding that all individuals with HIV/AIDS, as a class, are 
disabled under the ADA. 
Both the Senate and the House of Representative considered HIV infection 
and AIDS as disabilities under the ADA,68 without delving into individualized 
examinations.  Both Senate and House reports accepted and concurred with the 
DOJ’s conclusion that “a person infected with [HIV] is covered under the first 
prong of the definition of the term disability because of a substantial limitation 
to procreation and intimate sexual relations.”69 
 
 63. Edwards v. Valdez, 789 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 64. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2007). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). 
 66. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 67. United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 561 (1982). 
 68. Maida, supra note 56, at 306 (pointing out that both the House and Senate reports considered 
HIV as a disability and even went so far as including it in its list of representative disorders). 
 69. HOUSE LABOR REPORT at pt. 2, at 52; SENATE REPORT at 22; see Memorandum from Douglas 
W. Kamiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to 
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Moreover, related both to the ADA’s purpose and the legislative history is 
Congress’ belief that ending discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS is a 
crucial element in the public health strategy for combating the spread of the 
disease.70  The former Chairperson of the President’s Commission on the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, Admiral Watkins, pressed Congress to enact 
a strong national policy aimed at preventing discrimination.  Admiral Watkins 
testified that “discrimination against individuals with HIV infection is 
widespread and has serious repercussions for both the individual who 
experiences it and this Nation’s efforts to control the epidemic.”71  Both 
chambers included this testimony in their reports.72  ADA protection for 
individuals with HIV/AIDS is crucial to stopping the spread of the disease 
because discrimination pushes the disease underground, perpetuates stigma 
associated with the disease and, as a consequence, prevents people from getting 
tested and treated.73  The House, agreeing with the Commission, believed that 
the ADA was necessary to ensure that “all persons with symptomatic and 
asymptomatic HIV infection [would] be clearly included as persons with 
disabilities.”74  This is unequivocal language indicating that all people with HIV 
are disabled. 
The congressional record is replete with statements by representatives 
indicating that HIV/AIDS is a “disability” under the ADA.  This sentiment was 
so widespread it seems as if it was almost taken for granted.  One example is the 
statement of Congressman McDermott who said that people with HIV are 
“covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the ADA  . . . . As 
a physician, I know that although the major life activity that is affected at any 
point along the spectrum by the HIV infection may be different, an effect on 
some major life activity exists from the time of HIV infection.”75  Indeed, even 
the ADA’s most vociferous detractors, such as Senator Helms, recognized that 
people with HIV are a protected class under the ADA. 76  That is probably one of 
the reasons he opposed the bill. 
Critics of the per se disability position highlight that the ADA drafters 
rejected a proposal to treat disability as a category of protected people similar to 
the protected classes of Title VII: gender, race, national origin, and religion.  
However, that decision was driven “by political considerations and a calculated 
 
Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President (Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in Hearings on S. 933, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. 
on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1989). See also HERMANN, supra note 16, 
at 797 (discussing the importance of the House and Senate reports and their acceptance of the DOJ 
report); MAIDA, supra note 56, at 306 (also discussing the importance of the House and Senate reports 
and their acceptance of the DOJ report). 
 70. See Maida, supra note 56, at 306–07. 
 71. SENATE REPORT at 8; HOUSE LABOR REPORT at pt. 2, at 31.  See also MAIDA, supra note 56, at 
307. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Maida, supra note 56, at 306–07. 
 74. HOUSE LABOR REPORT at pt. 2, at 31.  See also Hermann, supra note 16, at 787. 
 75. 136 CONG. REC. H2626 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. McDermott). See Wendy 
E. Parmet and Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the New Social Construction of 
HIV,  23 AM. J. L. AND MED. 7, 21 (1997). 
 76. 135 CONG. REC. S10, 765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
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legal judgment that, based on Rehabilitation Act precedent, this definition was 
functionally equivalent to Title VII.”77 
One commentator has summarized the legislative history of HIV under the 
ADA succinctly, stating: 
While all of the Congressional legislative reports on the ADA that considered 
the question of whether HIV infection is a disability under the ADA reached the 
same conclusion that it is  . . .  none of the reports actually proceeded through a 
step-by-step analysis under the actual terms of the statute to show how AIDS 
and HIV infection met the statutory criteria for disability.  Instead, these reports 
simply assume that the impairment caused by HIV is a significant physical 
impairment and that persons with HIV are assumed to have a disability.78 
Hence, Congress clearly believed that HIV was a per se disability and did not 
find it necessary to undergo a step-by-step analysis to do so. 
C. Administrative Regulations 
Congress’ inclusion of those with HIV as per se disabled, and thus 
protected under the ADA, is also found in the administrative regulations.  The 
statute specifically authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate regulations 
implementing Title III of the ADA.79  Because of this congressional authorization 
the regulations carry significant weight and are not to be ignored as recent 
decisions have done.80  The regulations should be given additional gravitas 
when one considers that the statute is far from definitive in indicating that an 
individual inquiry must be conducted. 
Consistent with the House and Senate Reports that adopted the DOJ 
Memorandum, which declared that asymptomatic HIV individuals are disabled 
because HIV substantially limits the major life activities of reproduction and 
intimate sexual relations, is the definitions section of the DOJ regulations which 
adopts the same language.81  The agency charged with implementing regulations 
for Title I of the Act,82 the EEOC, adopts even more uncompromising language.  
The EEOC regulations explain how in most cases “[t]he determination of 
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or 
diagnosis of the impairment the person has  . . . . Some impairments may be 
disabling for particular individuals but not for others.”83  The regulations 
continue, stating “[o]ther impairments, however, such as HIV infection, are 
 
 77. Maida, supra note 56, at 305.  See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened?  Why? And What Can We Do About It?, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
91, 91–93, 126–29 (2000). 
 78. Hermann, supra note 16, at 813. 
 79. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2007) (“Not later than 1 year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted July 26, 1990], the Attorney General shall issue 
regulations in an accessible format to carry out the provisions of this title [42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq] “) 
 80. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999). 
 81. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. B Section 36.104 (2007). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (“Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act [enacted July 
26, 1990], the Commission shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this title”) 
 83. 29 C.F.R. 1630 App. (2007). 
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inherently substantially limiting.”84  HIV is the example that the regulations 
point to as undoubtedly being substantially limiting.  The Technical Assistance 
Manual on Title I echoes this by describing how “[s]ome impairments, such as 
blindness, deafness, HIV infection or AIDS, are by their nature substantially 
limiting.”85  To complete the enthymeme: HIV is thus, by its nature, a disability. 
Bragdon recognized the validity of both the pre- and post-ADA regulations.  
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Court’s “holding is confirmed by a 
consistent course of agency interpretation before and after the enactment of the 
ADA.”86  The Court also condoned the adding of HIV to the representative list of 
disorders constituting a physical impairment.87  Moreover, relying on the 
administrative regulations to help interpret the definition of disability in the 
ADA is consistent with Chevron analysis.88  Chevron analysis, as explained by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corporation, first requires courts to 
determine whether Congress intended to grant the agency the power to issue 
regulations with the “force of law” on the subject in question. 89  If there is such a 
delegation, courts are to examine whether the statute’s meaning is clear or 
ambiguous/silent.90  If the meaning is clear then the regulations should be 
consistent with the statute.  If the meaning is ambiguous or silent, then courts 
are to defer to the agency interpretation so long as the interpretation is 
reasonable.91  If there is no delegation then the regulations are not entitled to 
Chevron deference (though they may be entitled to some lower level of 
deference).92 
Here, Congress’ intent to have the agencies issue regulations with the 
“force of law” is made evident both by the explicit charge to the agencies to 
issue regulations and by Congress’ acknowledgement of the pre-ADA 
regulations which it approved, endorsed, and incorporated.93  As outlined in the 
previous sections, a strong argument can be made based on the plain meaning 
and legislative intent that HIV was intended to be considered a per se disability 
and thus any regulation to that affect is consistent with the statute.  However, at 
worst, the statute is ambiguous or silent as to the meaning of disability and thus 
the agency regulations should be deferred to if reasonable.  Here, the regulatory 
definitions are eminently reasonable especially when considered in light of the 
text, legislative history, and purpose of the ADA all which support a per se 
disability ruling and, more generally, are geared towards protecting individuals 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. EEOC, Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, at T-II (1992). 
 86. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998). 
 87. Id. at 646; 28 C.F.R. 36.104(1)(iii) (2007). 
 88. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Maida, supra 
note 56, at n.121 (highlighting the role of Chevron analysis and how if the language is not clear, then 
agencies can be empowered to fill the gap). 
 89. Id. at 843–44; United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 90. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–30. 
 91. Chevron, 467 U.S. at  844; Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. 
 92. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 
 93. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b); § 12116. (2007), MAIDA, supra 
note 56, at 307. 
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with disabilities from the scourge of discrimination.  As a result, great deference 
should be given to the agency regulations. 
Despite Congress’s delegation to the agencies and their recognition of that 
delegation in Bragdon, the Court, just one year later in Sutton, had a change of 
heart.  In Sutton, the Court wrongly ignored the EEOC regulations, arguing that 
because of the ADA’s structure, no agency had been delegated authority to issue 
regulations regarding the definitions sections, 12101 and 12102.94  The argument 
in Sutton was that Section 12116 of the ADA commands the EEOC to “issue 
regulations [ . . . ] to carry out this subchapter.”95  According to the majority, the 
reference to “this subchapter” confines the regulations scope to Title I, Sections 
12111-12117.96  However, as Justice Breyer highlights in his dissent, the EEOC is 
empowered to “elaborate through regulations the meaning of the term 
‘disability’ if elaboration is needed in order to ‘carry out’ the substantive 
provision of ‘this subchapter.’”97  Also, the term “disability” is ubiquitous 
throughout Title I and because the term is used in the subchapter referred to by 
Congress, the EEOC is empowered to issue regulations to clarify its meaning.98  
Finally, the language “in this subchapter” was most likely added to distinguish 
the EEOC’s ability to regulate employment and the DOJ’s ability to regulate 
under Title III as opposed to limiting either agency’s ability to interpret the 
meaning of “disability.” 
In addition to the current regulations, the previous legal history of the 
ADA is overwhelming in its endorsement of the interpretation of HIV as a per se 
disability. 
D. Prior Legal History 
As described above in the Overview of the ADA, Congress, knowing how the 
courts and regulations had interpreted the definition of handicap in the 
Rehabilitation Act, used the same definition and regulations in the ADA.99  As 
Abbott’s brief points out, “every reported decision under the Rehabilitation and 
the Fair Housing Act had determined that asymptomatic HIV constituted a 
disability.”100  The list of court decisions ruling that asymptomatic HIV is a per se 
disability is voluminous. 
In Cain v. Hyatt, the court ruled that “HIV infection constitutes a substantial 
limitation upon major life activities.”101  The court in Thomas v. Atascadero Unified 
School District held that “[p]ersons infected with the AIDS virus suffer 
 
 94. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999); Maida, supra note 56, at n.162. 
 95. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2007). 
 96. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478. 
 97. Id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See Maida, supra note 56 at n.162 (quoting and highlighting 
Breyer’s recognition that the term disability is throughout the ADA and thus the EEOC would have 
the authority to help define the term). 
 98. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at.514–15 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 99. See discussion supra at 4. 
 100. Brief, at 9–10.  See Hermann, supra note 16, at 853 (also  pointing out that “every agency that 
addressed the problem before enactment of the ADA reached the conclusion that those with HIV 
infection were handicapped”) 
 101. 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
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significant impairments of their major life activities.”102  In Doe v. Garrett, the 
court noted that “it is well established that infection with AIDS constitutes a 
handicap for the purposes of the [Rehabilitation] Act.”103  Surprisingly, though 
Bragdon skirted the issue of whether or not HIV/AIDS was a per se disability, 
the Court also recognized that “[e]very court which addressed the issue before 
the ADA was enacted in July 1990 . . .  concluded that asymptomatic HIV 
infection satisfied the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of a handicap.”104  The 
Court did so while citing a cache of cases even more comprehensive than the 
one included in the Plaintiff’s brief.105 
This prior legal history revolving around the Rehabilitation Act is of 
incredible significance given the standard canon of construction that presumes 
that when Congress enacts a new law incorporating language or sections of 
previous law, Congress is aware of the previous judicial interpretations and 
adopts them as part of the new statute unless otherwise specified.106  That 
presumption is all the more valid here because Congress gave explicit directions 
that the ADA be interpreted in alignment with such prior legal history and 
dictated that no lower standards or protections be applied than those applied in 
the Rehabilitation Act.107  Indeed, the ADA was specifically drafted to 
incorporate the Rehabilitation Act and its prior interpretation because 
lawmakers were comfortable with the act and the judicial interpretations of it.108 
Given that the prior legal history, agency regulations, legislative history 
and plain text support the idea that HIV, even when asymptomatic, is a per se 
disability under the ADA, the Court should either rule as such based on the 
overwhelming weight of legal evidence or Congress should clarify its intention 
to include HIV/AIDS as a per se disability.  However, aside from the purely 
legalistic or formalistic reasons to rule that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability, there 
are also policy reasons and practical benefits to the per se disability rule. 
V. THE POLICY AND PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF A PER SE DISABILITY RULING 
Until this point, the focus of this note has been to justify HIV/AIDS as a per 
se disability from a legal perspective.  Focusing on the law should not 
overshadow the more fundamental reason why a per se ruling is necessary: 
because of the protection it would provide.  It would serve as the full 
embodiment of Congress’s intent in passing the ADA, fundamentally changing 
how the least amongst us are viewed. 
 
 102. 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1987); see HERMANN, supra note 16, at 807–08 (discussing the 
court’s treatment of an asymptomatic HIV positive individual as per se handicapped under the 
Rehabilitation Act). 
 103. 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 104. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644 (1998); see Brief, at 61–62. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s Theatres, Inc., v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978). 
 107. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2007). 
 108. See Maida, supra note 56, at 305, Feldblum, supra note 77, at 91–93, 101–02, 126–29 (both 
discussing Congress’s intent to continue the previous interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act with 
the enactment of the ADA). 
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Put simply, a per se disability rule protects people with HIV/AIDS from 
the discrimination that has plagued the disease since before its official naming 
and discovery.  This protection becomes all the more important when one 
considers that HIV/AIDS discrimination has often been linked with and used as 
a reason for discriminating against some of societies most marginalized groups, 
notably homosexuals and Haitians.  Indeed, before the disease was officially 
termed AIDS, it was known originally known as “GRID,” or gay-related 
immune deficiency. 109  Sadly and shockingly, some people still refer to it as such. 
By ruling that HIV is a per se disability, the loophole that currently exists 
would be closed.  As discussed above, under Bragdon, a “major life activity” 
must be identified, followed by an individualized inquiry into whether the 
physical impairment affects the major life activity.  However, with regard to the 
“major life activity” of reproduction, homosexuals and people who are unable to 
have children, may not be protected by the ADA.110  This is particularly true 
given the recent trend toward limiting what constitutes a “major life activity.”111 
Even though homosexuals have recently found ways to procreate, 
“reproduction is generally regarded [wrongly or rightly] as a heterosexual 
activity.”112  In fact, “courts and commentators alike have expressly excluded gay 
men and lesbians from the class of people who procreate.”113  Indeed, the court 
in Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., N.A. directly questions the role of 
reproduction in the homosexual plaintiff’s life and whether or not reproduction 
was a “major life activity” for that individual.114  If what constitutes a major life 
activity is limited, and HIV is not regarded as a per se disability, then 
homosexuals, post-menopausal women, and others will be unable to gain 
protected status under a different major life activity.  The result is that certain 
people are not protected simply because of their age, hormones, or sexuality—
an unacceptable result. 
On a practical level, a per se disability ruling saves the courts and parties 
resources and time in litigation.  By considering HIV/AIDS a per se disability, 
courts avoid the extensive discovery and individualized inquiry that closely 
scrutinizes every aspect of a plaintiff’s life and the disease’s impact on it.  Courts 
can devote more attention either to other cases or, within HIV-ADA cases, to the 
most pressing question of whether or not the disability is the reason for the 
discrimination. 
Finally and briefly, some defense.  One of the main concerns by critics of a 
per se disability ruling is that it will lead to fluvial litigation and frivolous 
suits.115  These suits run the risk of both watering down the ADA and exposing 
businesses to financially debilitating liability.  However, though a per se 
 
 109. Avert.org , The History of AIDS: 1981-1986, http://www.avert.org/his81_86.htm (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2007). 
 110. Schneider, supra note 2, at 221. 
 111. See, e.g.  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482—83; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521. 
 112. Michelle R. King & Beth S. Herr, The Consequences and Implications of a Case-by-Case Analysis 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for Asymptomatic HIV-Positive Gay Men and Lesbians Post-
Bragdon, 8 LAW & SEX. 531, 546 (1998). 
 113. Id. 
 114. 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 115. Schneider, supra note 2, at 228. 
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disability ruling would expand the size of the protected class, an important 
check remains.  To win a suit under the ADA, discrimination must occur and it 
must be based on the disability.116  Just because a person is HIV positive, i.e. 
disabled, and is dismissed from her job, does not ensure that she has won her 
suit.  Instead, by streamlining the analysis for HIV-positive individuals, the 
focus of litigation is brought back to the motivation and action of the 
defendants.  This rightly refocuses the discussion on protecting the disabled and 
ensuring that defendants who do not mistreat the disabled out of fear or malice 
are also protected.  This is contrary to the current focus on forcing plaintiffs to 
become martyrs and prove that they really, honestly, are disabled, and that their 
lives have been substantially devastated. 
There is also a very real concern that labeling people with HIV as per se 
disabled would further stigmatize them given the historical negatives associated 
with the term “disabled.”  This is an important concern, but one that can be 
somewhat mitigated.  First, by including HIV positive individuals as disabled 
under the ADA, they are provided legal protection against potential 
stigmatization and discrimination.  That protection will have downstream 
affects on societal norms.  Moreover, not discounting the stigma associated with 
being disabled, these individuals are already battling the stigma of being HIV 
positive that may be even more intense.  Further, in discrimination cases such as 
Bragdon, plaintiffs are arguing that, despite their condition they are in fact able 
to do their jobs and that they should be given an equal and fair chance to 
compete, and work, free of discrimination and stigma. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, HIV/AIDS should be considered a per se disability under the 
ADA because it is legally sound, good public policy, and practically sensible.  
The plain text, legislative history, administrative regulations, and prior legal 
history all demonstrate that HIV was intended to be considered a per se 
disability and HIV victims were not intended to undergo an extensive, probing, 
case-by-case analysis.  Also, a per se rule would ensure that people with barriers 
to reproduction such as menopause, infertility, or homosexuality are not 
unfairly excluded from the ADA’s protection, giving full effect to Congress’ 
expansive purpose.  Because of the requirement that a person be actually 
discriminated against because of their disability, this rule will not clog the courts 
nor lead to frivolous litigation.  For these reasons, the Supreme Court should 
rule or Congress should clarify that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability and by 
doing so help to relight the beacon that is the ADA. 
 
 116. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2007). 
